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An Assessment of Factors Important to Legislators in Budget Decisions;
How Much Impact Can Agencies Have?
Abstract
Budget deliberations represent a dynamic interaction between many actors, including agency
officials and legislators. There may be opposing perceptions about the relative importance of various
types of information and there are likely many priority factors that legislators base their decisions on,
which budget officials may, or may not, have the ability to impact or control. Through a survey of
state legislators we first determined the relative importance of 27 factors in approving budget
proposals. We compared these ratings with the assessments of both budget / fiscal analysts, and
agency budget officials, who were also asked which of the 27 factors they perceived as important to
legislators. Agency officials were also asked to rate the degree that they can impact each of the 27
factors. We considered how the difference in party affiliation of legislators relates to the type of
information they view as important in budget decisions. We then compared the importance ratings of
legislators with the impact ratings of budget officials, which led to some recommendations aimed at
agency officials.

INTRODUCTION
In most government jurisdictions, each budget cycle comes with the ritual of agency directors,
accountants and program managers shifting their focus from their routine duties to the important
process of budget strategy and preparation. Budget actors from both the legislative and executive side
interact with stakeholders and interest groups in a dynamic interaction to develop the budget proposals
considered by legislatures. Despite the efforts of agency officials in developing their requests, the
legislature may approve funding for programs that were never requested or even envisioned, the
executive never considered or was made aware of, and powerful interest groups and lobbyists did not
represent. Conversely, agency officials and other interests may actively push a proposal that does not
get approved by legislators. These two extremes demonstrate that the decision making behavior of
legislators, particularly related to budgeting issues, is an important area of inquiry.
There is a fairly rich tradition in political science that considers the behavior of legislators and
of legislative institutions, such as Kingdon’s (1989), analysis of congressional decision-making and
the earlier work of Davidson (1969) and Froman (1967). The above researchers advanced knowledge
related to the participants in congressional decision-making, as well as the environment, structure, and
process. However, for public administrators, these studies provide little guidance as to how they can
bring the most appropriate and meaningful information to legislators for consideration. In fact, there
has been sparse research considering the decision making calculus of legislators related to budget
proposals, and even less research relating to the relative impact that agency actors can have on factors
important to legislators.
There have certainly been many correlates of budget success presented and discussed in the
public administration literature, ranging from factors in the external environment to more interpersonal
factors. Factors such as the economy, the budget process itself, and the relationships between the
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governor and the legislature all have great impact on whether budget proposals are favorably
considered by the legislature (Rubin 2010). State agency personnel have little or no control over these
factors, but other factors may be controllable. Identifying these factors could lead to effective
strategies, and a higher probability of receiving favorable consideration, which represents both our
purpose and contribution.
The core research question of the current study is: What factors are most important to
legislators in approving budget proposals (we call importance)? But the primary purpose of the study
is to consider the more pragmatic question for public administrators: What is the degree that agency
budget officials can impact the factors that have the most importance to legislators?
We address the first question by reporting on the results of surveys of legislators, budget
analysts from the legislative and executive sides, and agency budget officials. The relative importance
of many factors that can be used by legislators in approving budget proposals is assessed, from the
perspectives of these three types of actors. Thus, we are able to compare importance across factors and
the perceptions of importance across groups, and begin to analyze reasons for any differences.
The second question is addressed by having respondents identify the factors that agency
personnel can impact most. This allows us to compare importance to impact. Finally, we go a step
further by considering how the party affiliation of legislators can impact the type of information they
value in making decisions. This is only one of many potential contextual variables.
Because there is a dearth of research related to our purpose and research questions, our study is
largely exploratory. We will, however, create a context by first discussing some of the relevant
literature related to the topic of budgetary decision making as well as agency personnel impacting
legislators in budget processes. We will then discuss the methods used in the study before reporting on
the results and discussing implications.
Budget Interactions between Agency Officials and Legislators
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A discussion of the determinants of budgetary outcomes typically starts with a structural focus
on the incremental nature of budgetary decisions, which has been well established (Davis et al.1966,
1974; Wildavsky 1964). Such a deterministic view implies less room for decision making on an
individual level, but instead describes an inertial system with standard operating systems based in
bureaucracy. However, within these structures allowances have been made for changes – sometimes
significant – that typically are initiated by events outside of the budgeting process (True 2000).
A behavioral decision model is not in opposition to the structural approach, but can supplement
it. Such a model has a basis in the bounded rationality tradition of Simon (1957, 1972). In public
budgeting, this perspective has evolved into a microbudgeting focus, which considers actors and their
respective strategies (Thurmaier 1995; Thurmaier and Willoughby 2001). Although an evolving
literature, with regard to informing public administrators about effective budget techniques, it is
limited.
Agency budget actors must consider the budget process and environment and, according to
Stillman (2005), their most effective strategies are to document need and the ability to save money.
Rubin (2010) provides further detail on agencies’ strategies including ways to make agency requests
more urgent or necessary than other requests, tactics to make requests seem cheap or cost effective,
linking proposals to priorities of powerful players or legislators themselves, and finally, tactics to
lessen the competition for funding. This work provides some guidance to agency budget officials who
are attempting to get budget proposals passed. However, it is not based on direct empirical evidence
garnered from legislators, or other budget actors, about what they consider important in the budget
process.
There is an existing literature related to the impact of various actors and institutions on the
budgeting process and outcomes, often with U.S. state governments as the unit of analysis. The
prevailing wisdom in public administration is that budget decisions are impacted by a variety of
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different actors (i.e., agency officials, legislative and executive analysts, interest groups, individuals
and courts), as well as the budget process itself and the economic environment (Stillman 2005).
There is a rich history of research, also on the state governmental level, analyzing determinants of
budget outcomes; results have shown that economic and demographic variables are more predictive
than political variables (Dye 1966; Hofferbert 1966; Dawson 1967).
Of the studies considering the impact of institutional and individual actors at the state level,
there has been a lot of emphasis on the relative impact of executives and legislatures on budget
outcomes. Perhaps the classic study that considered the methods used by agency officials to influence
budget decisions of legislators was Sharkansky’s (1968) examination of 592 major agency budgets for
one budget period in 19 different states. He considered agency budget requests, gubernatorial
recommendations, and final legislative appropriations. Sharkansky found gubernatorial support a
critical ingredient in budget success of individual agencies and that the more agencies request the more
they receive (acquisitiveness). His conclusions were that the governor had more power related to
budgeting than legislatures. He also noted that various economic factors are important because they
impact both the Governor’s recommendations and legislative action on budgets.
Later attempts to replicate Sharkansky’s methods led to somewhat different conclusions.
Moncrief and Thompson (1980) concluded that governors had the upper hand under conditions of
unified government but under divided government legislatures were not as likely to defer to the
governor, a result that Clark (1997, 1998) generally found support for using data from the 1990s.
Thompson (1987) found legislatures less likely to defer to the governor when he used Sharkansky’s
methods in a later time period (1978-1980). Thompson stressed that economic conditions were
different during the time period of his study, compared to Sharkansky’s, and reminded us again that
economic conditions are important to consider when studying budget outcomes. He also stressed the
importance of considering the degree of agency professionalism and gubernatorial influence, both of
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which are factored into the current study. Overall, one could tentatively conclude that legislatures do
tend to defer to the governor, although perhaps not as much as times past, and not as much under
divided government.
A connected research stream also considers the relative impact of the governor versus the
legislature, but using the primary research approach of surveys rather than examining budget
documents. Abney and Lauth (1987, 1998) surveyed budget officials in the 1980s and 1990s, finding
a large decrease in the perception of the gubernatorial influence between time periods, leading them to
question executive dominance over state budgeting outcomes (Abney and Lauth 1998). However, the
debate is far from being over, since Goodman (2007), also surveying budget analysts, found that they
perceived the governor, not the legislature, to benefit from the most recent power shifts. This
conclusion was supported by a more extensive analysis by Dometrius and Wright (2010).
The Abney and Lauth (1987, 1998) surveys of state budget officials also considered broader
perceptions of budget outcomes; particularly, and closest to the objective of the current study, agency
strategies that can lead to successful outcomes. They measured perceptions about factors that
influenced governors’ support for agency budget requests. Factors judged most important were the
ability of an agency to demonstrate need, the nexus between agency requests and gubernatorial
priorities, program efficiency and effectiveness, and agency acquisitiveness. All of the above factors
are controllable to some extent by agencies. But, the factor that is most controllable, of course, is
acquisitiveness. The current study goes further in considering perceptions about importance from a
broader set of actors, and also considers the degree that agencies can impact budget outcomes.
Rather than considering influence over budgeting outcomes, Duncombe and Kinney (1987)
considered how agency officials, executive budget analysts and legislative analysts defined agency
budget success. Respondents defined budget success in many ways, including obtaining sufficient
funds to meet agency needs and maintain agency programs, maintaining good relationships with
5

legislative and executive budget staff, gaining flexibility in using funds, and good budget
implementation. Perhaps surprising for those who believe in the budget maximizing bureaucrat model
(Niskanen 1971), the appropriation amount compared to the previous budget or the budget request was
not the most important indicator of success. Not surprising was their finding that economic and fiscal
conditions have a great impact on how agencies approach the budget process and define success, a
point supported by Forsythe (2004). He added the extent of changes proposed, incentives for
cooperation or competition among leaders, and the political calendar or timing of elections of the
involved players as factors that consistently affect budget dynamics. Although informative related to
perceptions or likelihood of success, the purpose of these research projects was not to study successful
techniques agency officials can use to achieve budget success, however defined.
Another line of inquiry in public administration, albeit sparse, that is related to the interactions
of bureaucrat agents and legislative principals is the interpersonal power literature. When agents
attempt to influence principals, they are attempting to exercise power in order to get their own way.
Jensen (2007) considered influence tactics used in structured policy decision groups, which in many
ways could include appropriations committees. As a framework he relied on the rich literature on
interpersonal power in the organizational behavior literature, finding that rational persuasion and
charisma were the most effective techniques used out of those studied. A follow-up study by
Stenstrom and Haycock (2014), specific to budgeting choices, also considered how interpersonal
influence tactics can impact outcomes. They found that the tactics “authority,” and “consistency and
commitment,” were important. Particularly important was “liking,” which was defined as “a mutual
affinity between the target and agent” (Stenstrom and Haycock 2014, 4).
The tactic of “liking” has obvious ties to relationship building and maintenance and links into
research by other public administration scholars, who have given more direct prescriptions for budget
officials working with politicians. In fact, some recommend that budget officers become politicians
6

themselves, engaging in the cultivation of client groups, focusing on building confidence and forming
relationships with appropriations committees, and developing political skills that would allow the
exploitation of budgetary opportunities (e.g., Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky 1966, 1974; Wildavsky
and Caiden 2004). These authors stress becoming a politician as being more important than
demonstrating efficiency.
Budgeting is synonymous with policy making (Wildavsky 1988). Thus, the policy literature
can be somewhat informative related to legislative decision making. Some issues receive more
attention because they reach a level of salience, forcing legislators to consider them carefully. The
presence of issue salience (e.g., Baumgartner and Jones 1993) in budgetary situations creates the
possibility that agency officials could benefit from taking advantage of policy bandwagons when
proposing expenditure increases, or even reductions. Activism on the part of constituents and interest
groups has become commonplace in legislatures from the U.S. Congress on down to city councils, and
is related to salience. It is sometimes remarkable how issues revolve around individual actors or
circumstances, reach the threshold, are placed on the public agenda, and are passed into law amidst a
bandwagon flurry of attention and support. At times, even one constituent can make a difference.
Clearly, agency officials can benefit by recognizing when issues are ripe for consideration by
legislators and what direction the bandwagon might be leading them.
In some ways, when agency officials attempt to influence their politician principals, there is
also a link to the literature on lobbying. Thus, some insight can be gained from considering successful
techniques that lobbyists use when interacting with members of Congress. Wolpe and Levine (1996)
report that the five most important commandments for lobbyists are: tell the truth, never promise more
than you can deliver, know how to listen, work with staff, and don’t spring any surprises. These
common sense approaches can certainly apply to bureaucrats working with the executive office and
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legislators in getting their budget proposals approved, and are perhaps indicative of budget success.
But again, the factors were not derived directly from asking legislators themselves.
Although researchers have done very important work related to budget interactions and
dynamics, they have not directly considered factors important to legislative budget success by asking
legislators themselves, nor have they considered the degree that agency officials can even have an
impact on these factors.
METHODS
The sampling frame employed in this study consists of public officials within a U.S. state. In
this particular state, the executive branch, through the governor and budgeting office, is responsible for
developing the budget process and submitting the governor’s budget plan to the legislature.
Legislators, by law, spend a period of time reviewing the governor’s proposal, as well as many other
budget proposals included in bills submitted to the legislature. Approval of final budget appropriations
for state agencies often occurs in the final hours of the last legislative day. There is a balanced budget
requirement, meaning that there can be debt for long term assets, but there must not be a negative
general fund balance.
Budget guidelines are provided to state agency budget officials. Budgets are submitted to the
budgeting office where they are reviewed and prepared for inclusion in the governor’s budget plan.
Agency budget officials then present their budget proposals to the legislature.
Sample
Surveys were administered to three groups of respondents:
1) Legislators that have served on appropriations committees during the last three legislative
sessions. Legislators were limited to those serving on appropriations committees because these
committees make recommendations to the full legislative body regarding passage of
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appropriations bills and, for the most part, their recommendations are accepted by their
respective chamber.
2) Legislative and executive fiscal / budget analysts.
3) Agency budget officials who have served in their position within the last three legislative
sessions. Agency budget officials were defined as the person in the state agency who is most
responsible for the budget strategy for the agency. In smaller agencies this may be the agency
director; in others it could be the deputy or assistant director, the chief financial officer or a
separate legislative liaison that approves all budget testimony of the agency.
Survey Instruments
The purpose of this study was to identify: 1) the factors that are most important to legislators in
approving budget proposals and 2) which of these factors agency personnel can impact the most. With
these goals in mind, the surveys were developed through the following steps:
1) Open-ended interviews were conducted with key budget experts from the three categories –
agency budget officials, legislators, and budget analysts. Interviewees were asked to identify
the most important factors that legislators use in deciding on budget proposals. The interviewer,
who was one of the authors, recorded responses. Responses were then compared across
interviewees and a comprehensive list of factors was derived.
2) The related literature was then used to refine the list by adding or subtracting factors. A total of
27 factors were identified that could potentially influence legislative budget decisions.
3) Three distinct, but overlapping, surveys were developed using the list of factors.
4) The surveys were piloted with two legislators, a legislative fiscal analyst, and a budget analyst.
They provided feedback both on the clarity and design of the instrument as well as opinions
about any aspect of the survey that could become controversial. The surveys were then refined
into final form.
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The 27 factors are contained in Table 1. Following is a description of the survey that was
developed for each respondent group:
1) Legislator Survey: The survey distributed to legislators contained two sections. First, they
were asked to rate how important each of the 27 factors was to their decision to approve a
budget proposal. The response anchors were 1 and 6, ranging from least important to most
important, with an option for “don’t know” or “not applicable.” Survey instructions had to
vary according to the type of respondent. In section 2 of the survey, some demographic
information was collected: Number of legislative sessions served on appropriations (more
than 3 / 3 or less); House membership (House / Senate); and party affiliation (Democrat /
Republican).
2) Analyst Survey: Legislative and executive budget analysts received the identical survey as
outlined above for legislators, except they were instructed to rate how important each of the
factors appears to be in legislators’ decisions to approve a budget proposal. Section 2 only
contained one question asking them how many legislative sessions they have served as a
budget analyst (more than 3 / 3 or less).
3) Budget Official Survey: The survey given to budget officials contained three sections.
Section 1 was identical to the first section of the legislator and analyst surveys. Officials
were asked to rate how important each of the 27 factors appears to be in legislators’
decisions to approve a budget proposal. In section 2, they were asked to rate how much
impact or control they felt they could have on each of the 27 factors (1-6, least impact to
most impact, with an option for “don’t know” or “not applicable”). In section 3, they were
asked how many legislative sessions they have served as a budget officer (more than 3 / 3
or less).
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In completing the surveys, all respondents were instructed to assume the state was not
experiencing a budget shortfall and that the overall state budget would tolerate a moderate (5% per
year) general fund increase in expenditures. We did this to attempt to control the economic conditions
factor, which the literature supported as important to budget decision making. We decided to make it a
constant across respondents rather than to assess it directly as a factor.
We anticipated that survey response rates could be an issue, particularly for legislators, for a
variety of reasons, including politics. Thus, the survey process was developed to ensure total
anonymity to respondents. Support was obtained for the survey from the chair of the committee
responsible for legislative management, and that support was indicated in the cover letter for the
survey of legislators. As a result the overall response rate across respondent types was a respectable 64%
(77 of 121 surveyed). The response rates by respondent type were 59% (29 out of 49 surveyed) for
legislators, 67% for analysts (8 out of 12) and 67% for agency budget officials (40 of 60 surveyed).
Analysis
This study used descriptive statistics to analyze and rank the mean and standard deviation of
importance and impact for each of the 27 factors. Analyses of variance (ANOVA) were used to
evaluate whether there were differences in importance ratings across subsets of the respondents.
Legislators were further stratified by chamber and party affiliation. In addition we present descriptive
statistics comparing the mean of these 27 factors of legislative importance by respondent type to the
mean of agency impact on these 27 factors; we did this to determine if there was consistency between
legislative importance and the ability of an agency to have an impact.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Factor Importance to Legislators Across Respondent Types
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Table 1 contains each factor, rank ordered according to overall mean for importance to
legislators, across all respondent types (legislators, analysts, and agency budget officials). The factor
with the highest mean score (most important) across respondent types is listed first, and so on.
Four of the top factors of legislative importance across all respondent types focused on the
worthiness of the proposal – whether it addresses a need, is supported by constituents, results in
efficiency in government and is for a program that performs well. Approval of proposal does not put
the budget out of balance answers the question “Can we afford it?” And, ranking, agency
representative has an existing positive relationship of trust and credibility with the legislator third
supports work by other researchers on the importance of relationships (e.g., Duncombe and Kinney
1987). Recall that the survey asks what factors the respondents think are most important to legislators
based on their experiences and observations.
Factor Importance to Legislators, by Respondent Type
Discrepancies arise when responses are considered by respondent type, as indicated in Table 1.
Note that budget officials and legislators made up 40 and 29 of the total 77 responses, respectively, so
the 8 analysts’ responses had much less of an impact on the total means. There was also a lot of
consistency between ranks of legislators and budget officials related to the bottom rankings, indicating
that some factors are judged less important consistently across respondent type.
To assess the degree of variation in means across the three respondent types, analyses of
variance (ANOVA) were conducted for each of the 27 factors. The results are presented in Table 2.
10 of the 27 factors showed a statistically significant difference in means between respondent types.
Using a Tukey post-hoc test, we determined which respondent type means were significantly different
for each factor. A comparison of the means of these ten factors is contained in Table 3.
Analysts’ mean ratings on seven of these ten factors were significantly different from
legislators’. With the exception of proposal does not require use of state general fund dollars and
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proposal requires < $100,000 from state general fund, analysts’ mean scores were lower than
legislators’ scores. Budget officials were significantly different from legislators on four of the ten
factors. And in only one case, proposal addresses a well established need, were analysts and budget
officials significantly different.
The observed differences are likely related – at least in part – to different perspectives that each
respondent type brings to the process, as well as respective roles and the information available.
Budget officials track appropriations related to their own agency. They generally do not have the time
nor the responsibility to follow budget proposals of other agencies, especially those that aren’t in some
way related to their own agency. This is related to the traditional view in public administration that
agencies are myopic. Although they are involved in conference committees, which debate the
proposals late in the process, they may not see some of the negotiations that occur in final
deliberations on appropriations where original good intentions get lost in high level strategies or
compromises.
Analysts, on the other had, are present at each meeting of an appropriations committee and
conference committee. They typically have a portfolio of state agency budgets. This provides them
with a broader view of the process compared to budget officials. They field questions from legislators
and they see what actually occurs in public hearings.
Finally, legislators attend party caucuses, leadership meetings, lobbyist events, and have
“hallway” conversations, where additional information is shared. All legislators are at all full
appropriations committee meetings but they are not all at sub-committee meetings where more
detailed work occurs on budget proposals. They are more often involved in the final negotiations on
proposals. It may be that, at the outset, they intend to consider proposals with well established needs,
efficiency in state and local government, proposal validity, supported by constituents, that do not put
the budget out of balance and for programs with good past performance. However, in the final
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deliberations these factors may lose out to those factors that analysts indicated they see as important to
legislators, such as proposal does not require use of state general fund dollars, proposal requires <
$100,000 from state general fund, proposal is included in own party leadership strategy and proposal
addresses issue with which legislator has had personal experience.
So what does this imply for the novice budget official? Those things that legislators have
identified as most important will get serious consideration. Two factors that were ranked high across
all three respondent types were, proposal is supported by constituents and agency representative has
an existing positive relationship of trust and credibility with legislator. These factors are consistent
with the existing literature on this topic, and the latter can be impacted by the official.
Two other factors regarding importance showed interesting results. Proposal is included in
budget proposal of the governor and proposal is included in the budget proposal of governor from
legislator’s own party both ranked in the bottom half at 18th and 22nd, respectively. This is inconsistent
with Sharkansky’s (1968) conclusions that the Governor’s support is a critical ingredient in budget
success. It is also inconsistent with the notion that state legislatures may defer more to the governor in
budgetary decisions, meaning they would be less likely to make changes to the governor’s budget,
particularly when the governor’s party controls the legislature (Clark 1998). However, the results are
consistent with Abney and Lauth (1998), who asserted the end of executive dominance in state
appropriations. Note that a proposal included in the budget of a governor of a legislator’s own party
ranked lower than being in the governor’s budget in general. Importantly, they were ranked
consistently that way by the different respondent types, with the exception of the budget proposal of
the governor in general which was ranked 8th by agency budget officials. Of note, the governorship
and both the House and Senate were controlled by the same party at the time of the survey.
Legislator Characteristics Related to Importance Ratings
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The survey included questions about each legislator’s party affiliation and the chamber they
serve in. Knowing whether different political parties and chambers consider different factors more
important to approval of budget proposals can be useful information to budget officials. The mean and
standard deviation of the 27 factors of importance to legislators by political party and chamber are
presented in Table 4.
There was a lot of consistency in the ranking of mean scores for the 27 factors between the
House and the Senate. There was much less consistency between the Democrats and Republicans in
ranking of mean scores of the 27 factors. Democrats’ top four factors were agency representative has
an existing positive relationship of trust and credibility with legislator, proposal is required as part of
national accreditation upon which funding is dependent, proposal addresses issue with which
legislator has had personal experience and proposal addresses a well established need. Republicans’
top four factors were proposal results in efficiency in state and local government, proposal addresses
a well established need, information provided by legislative fiscal analyst validates the accuracy of
proposal, and proposal is for program with good past performance. Noting these variances in ranking,
we conducted an independent samples t-test for all 27 factors, dividing legislator respondents into
House, Senate, Democrat, and Republican to determine if there were significant differences in mean
responses for these individual groups. Results indicate that with regard to political party, a significant
difference in means was present for 5 of the 27 factors. With regard to chamber, a significant
difference in means was present for only 1 factor. Table 5 shows means and t-scores for party and
chamber.
The only statistically significant difference in means between the House and the Senate is
proposal is required as part of national accreditation upon which funding is not dependent. The
Senate scored this higher than the House. Note that during the time of this survey, Republicans had the
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majority membership in both the House and the Senate, possibly explaining the low number of
differences between mean scores of the two chambers.
The means for 5 factors were rated differently by Democrats and Republicans. Proposal results
in efficiency in state or local government was rated higher by Republicans, while proposal addresses
issue with which legislator has had personal experience, proposal is required as part of national
accreditation upon which funding is dependent, agency representative has good speaking skills, and
agency representative uses technology were all rated higher by Democrats.
Advice to budget officials would be that Republicans value efficiency in government, program
needs and past program performance more while Democrats value relationships with budget officials,
accreditation, personal experience with an issue, and program need. Although Democrats scored
speaking skills and technology higher than Republicans, they were ranked towards the bottom for both
parties indicating that both parties value these two items less than other factors.
Assessing the Degree of Impact Agencies can have on Important Factors
After rating the importance of the 27 factors, agency budget officials rated each of the same 27
factors related to the amount of control or impact they felt they could have over each. Table 1 contains
a column showing the mean for each factor related to agency impact, allowing comparisons with the
mean of importance for all three respondent types.
Overall, budget official mean ratings of agency impact on each of the 27 factors were quite
high. The top agency impact factors were also rated fairly high in importance by legislators. A
comparison of the level of agency impact on the most important factors to legislators can be portrayed
with a difference score. Table 6 shows these difference scores for each of the 27 factors. Difference
scores that are in the positive direction indicate that legislative importance was rated higher on average
than agency impact, and scores in the negative direction indicate that importance was rated as
relatively low compared with agency ability to impact. Scores of 0, or close to 0, indicate that there
16

was continuity between important ratings and the agency impact ratings. Of the six factors that are
most important to legislators, the following had positive difference scores: proposal results in
efficiency in state or local government, legislative fiscal analyst validates accuracy of proposal,
proposal does not put budget out of balance, and proposal is supported by constituents. The following
factors had negative difference scores: proposal addresses a well established need, and program with
good past performance. Thus, according to these results, agencies would be best served by focusing on
substantiating need and performance, which they can control. Overall, agency officials reported that
they can impact many of the other factors legislators consider in the legislative appropriations process.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this study was to identify factors that are most important to legislators in
approving budget proposals and which of these factors agency personnel can impact most. There were
not a lot of surprises in the total respondent rankings of the 27 factors. There were however, significant
differences in how the individual respondent types scored the 27 factors. An interesting result that
should be pursued with future research was related to political party of legislators. Party affiliation of
legislators can have an impact on how they consider proposals and a wise agency official could use
this result as part of an overall strategy.
Agency budget officials generally feel that they can impact the factors that are most important
to legislators. But, there is variation, with some important factors being more open to impact than
others. Again, budget officials would be best served focusing on factors important to legislators, that
they can also be impact.
This study did not include an analysis of specific budget proposals to determine which factors
made each proposal successful. Such a project would be worthwhile, albeit complex. Opinions and
recollections of legislators on what is important may not square well with actual measures of
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legislative behavior or outcomes. This could be an important follow up study to see if the factors
identified in the current study are actually those that made a difference in approval of a proposal.
Although the governor is a key player in the budgeting process, the scope of this study was
limited to the decisions of legislators, since they grant the final spending authority. However, note that
two of the factors considered are that a proposal is included in the governor’s budget and that a
proposal is included in the governor’s budget from the legislator’s own party. Thus, indirectly
gubernatorial power was considered.
One of the narrative comments provided by an agency budget official was, “This process often
seems like a game for which I am not allowed to know the rules.” The results of this study may give
this individual, and other budget officials, encouragement. Despite the many things that are beyond
their control, there are some patterns that they can learn and follow in order to have a better chance of
a successful budget outcome.
The main shortcoming of the study is that it is essentially a case study of a single state. Due to
the complexity of the methodology, which includes creating the sampling frame, developing the
surveys, and getting permission to conduct the study, creating a cross-section of states would be
difficult. Case studies of states have a rich history in public administration and add to the cumulative
knowledge of the field (Jensen and Rodgers 2001). Nonetheless, the question of generalizability
becomes important. There is likely a lot of homogeneity across state legislatures related to the
processes used to develop budgets. Indeed many of the findings are not only intuitive but are
consistent with the literature, which bodes well for generalizability. However, there are likely some
state specific differences that have the potential to impact generalizability. For instance, the budgeting
method used. Performance based budgeting would necessitate an enhanced focus on performance
measures. Future research could utilize the surveys used here and apply them to other governmental
jurisdictions, and thereby test the degree that our findings generalize.
18
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TABLE 1
Mean Ranking of Legislative Importance According to Legislators, Budget Analysts and
Budget Officials, and Mean Ranking of Agency Impact According to Budget Officials

24
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* Note: The Total column contains the mean across the three groups based on a Likert scale from 1 (least important) to 6
(most important). The mean impact column reflects a Likert scale from 1 (least impact) to 6 (most impact).
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TABLE 2
Analysis of Variance Comparing the Mean Importance Ratings of Legislators,
Budget Analysts and Budget Officials
Overall Mean
F-Score

Proposal addresses a well established need
Proposal results in efficiency in state or local government
Agency representative has an existing positive
relationship of trust and credibility with legislator
Proposal is supported by constituents
Approval of proposal does not put the budget out of balance
Proposal is for program with good past performance
Information provided by legislative fiscal analyst
validates the accuracy of proposal
Proposal is included in own party leadership strategy
Proposal does not require use of state general fund dollars
Proposal addresses an issue with which legislator
has had personal experience
Proposal clearly helps agency accomplish its mission
Proposal carries recommendation of “Do Pass”
from policy committee
Budget presentation by agency representative is clear
Information provided by executive budget analyst
validates the accuracy of proposal
Proposal has clear outcome measures related to its goals
Proposal otherwise justified does not require FTE
Proposal is equitable to all those impacted
Proposal is included in the budget proposal of the Governor
Proposal is required as part of national accreditation
upon which funding is dependent
Proposal is supported by stakeholders
Proposal requires < $100,000 from state general fund
Proposal is included in budget proposal of governor from own party
Agency representative has good speaking skills
Proposal is required as part of national accreditation
upon which funding is not dependent
Agency representative uses technology to present proposal
Proposal has support of NCSL
Proposal is supported by legislative peers from other states

4.92
4.92
4.91

4.522*
5.164**
1.919

4.87
4.86
4.77
4.75

.345
1.921
2.902
.553

4.57
4.56
4.55

2.320
11.135**
2.182

4.50
4.44

4.407*
2.265

4.43
4.42

1.996
.603

4.42
4.42
4.35
4.32
4.28

8.782**
2.236
4.814*
5.550**
.176

4.24
4.05
3.89
3.79
3.39

5.542**
3.737*
.275
3.844*
.305

2.91
2.60
2.29

1.651
1.759
1.716

Note: * p < .05; ** p < .01; The mean importance column reflects a Likert scale from 1 (least important) to 6 (most
important).
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TABLE 3
ANOVA Post-Test: Differences between Respondent Types
Proposal addresses a well established need (1)
Proposal results in efficiency in state or local
government (2)
Proposal does not require use of state general
fund dollars (9)
Proposal clearly helps agency accomplish
its mission (11)
Proposal has clear outcome measures related
to its goals (15)
Proposal is equitable to all those impacted (17)
Proposal is included in the budget proposal of
the governor (18)
Proposal is supported by stakeholders (20)
Proposal requires < $100,000 from state
general fund (21)
Agency representative has good speaking
skills (23)

Analysts
4.00* #
4.25*

Budget
Official
5.00*
4.79

5.00#

4.90*

4.62*

3.50*

4.62

4.72*

3.00*

4.47

4.62*
3.83*

3.43*
4.00

4.31
4.75*

3.66*
3.69*

4.29
4.75*

4.67*
4.18

3.31*

3.75

4.16*

Legislator
5.07#
5.28*
3.97*

#

______________________________________________________________________________________________________

Note: * indicates that these two mean scores are significantly different (p<.05) between the two
respondent types marked for that factor. # indicates that these two mean scores are significantly
different (p<.05) between the two respondent types marked for that factor. Overall factor ranking
shown in parentheses.

28

TABLE 4
Mean Ranking of Legislative Importance (Legislators Only); Chamber and Party Affiliation

Note: The mean importance column reflects a Likert scale from 1 (least important) to 6 (most important).
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Table 5
Independent Samples T Tests Comparing Importance Ratings
for Categories of Chamber and Political Party
Mean
5.28
5.07
4.90
4.83
4.76
4.72
4.72
4.69

T-Score
Party
Chamber
-2.443*
-.808
.000
-1.210
-.129
-1.601
.835
-1.211
1.272
-.280
-.541
-.546
-.521
-.929
1.645
-.851

Proposal results in efficiency in state or local government
Proposal addresses a well established need
Legislative fiscal analyst validates accuracy of proposal
Proposal does not put budget out of balance
Proposal is supported by constituents
Program with good past performance
Proposal has clear outcome measures related to goals
Agency has positive relationship of trust and credibility with
legislator
Proposal is equitable to all impacted
4.62
.133
.000
Proposal clearly helps agency accomplish its mission
4.62
-.553
-1.586
Proposal is included in own party leadership strategy
4.54
-.763
-.156
Proposal addresses issue with which legislator has had
4.52
2.514*
-.801
personal experience
Executive budget analyst validates accuracy of proposal
4.34
.620
-1.746
Proposal has “Do Pass” recommendation from policy committee 4.24
.907
-2.050
Budget presentation by agency is clear
4.24
1.325
-1.199
Proposal is required as part of national accreditation upon
4.21
3.195**
-1.926
which funding is dependent
Proposal otherwise justified does not require FTE
4.07
.199
1.336
Proposal does not require use of state general fund dollars
3.97
1.220
-.841
Proposal is included in the budget proposal of the governor
3.83
1.533
-1.856
Proposal is included in budget proposal of governor from own
3.76
1.779
-1.111
party
Proposal requires < $100,000 from state general fund
3.69
1.295
-.116
Proposal is supported by stakeholders
3.66
1.846
-2.004
Proposal is required as part of national accreditation upon
3.45
1.756
-2.401*
which funding not dependent
Agency representative has good speaking skills
3.31
2.734*
-1.091
Agency representative uses technology
3.07
2.680*
-1.213
Proposal has support of NCSL
2.38
.526
.316
Proposal is supported by legislative peers from other states
2.07
1.690
1.116
___________________________________________________________________________________

Note: * p < .05; ** p < .01; The mean importance column reflects a Likert scale from 1 (least important) to 6 (most
important). A positive t value for Party indicates that Democrats rated the factor as more important, and vice-versa.
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Table 6
Difference Scores Comparing Importance for Legislators with Ability to Impact by Agency
Mean Importance Mean Impact
Legislators
Agency
Diff.
Proposal results in efficiency in state or local government
Proposal addresses a well established need
Legislative fiscal analyst validates accuracy of proposal
Proposal does not put budget out of balance
Proposal is supported by constituents
Program with good past performance
Proposal has clear outcome measures related to goals
Agency has positive relationship of trust and credibility with legislator
Proposal is equitable to all impacted
Proposal clearly helps agency accomplish its mission
Proposal is included in own party leadership strategy
Proposal addresses issue with which legislator has had personal experience
Executive fiscal analyst validates accuracy of proposal
Proposal has “Do Pass” recommendation from policy committee
Budget presentation by agency is clear
Proposal is required as part of national accreditation upon which funding is dependent
Proposal otherwise justified does not require FTE
Proposal does not require use of state general fund dollars
Proposal is included in the budget proposal of the governor
Proposal is included in budget proposal of governor from own party
Proposal requires < $100,000 from state general fund
Proposal is supported by stakeholders
Proposal is required as part of national accreditation upon which funding not dependent
Agency representative has good speaking skills
Agency representative uses technology
Proposal has support of NCSL
Proposal is supported by legislative peers from other states

5.28
5.07
4.90
4.83
4.76
4.72
4.72
4.69
4.62
4.62
4.54
4.52
4.34
4.24
4.24
4.21
4.07
3.97
3.83
3.76
3.69
3.66
3.45
3.31
3.07
2.38
2.07

4.89
5.17
4.17
3.92
4.29
4.85
5.08
5.2
5.28
4.46
3.59
3.9
1.26
4.24
5.38
3.42
4.03
4.2
4.49
3.90
3.76
4.69
3.06
4.80
3.97
2.14
1.80

0.39
-0.10
0.73
0.91
0.47
-0.13
-0.36
-0.51
-0.66
0.16
0.95
0.62
-0.03
0.00
-1.14
0.79
0.04
-0.23
-0.66
-0.14
-0.07
-1.03
0.39
-1.49
-0.90
0.24
0.27

Notes: The mean importance column reflects a Likert scale from 1 (least important) to 6 (most important). The mean
impact column reflects a Likert scale from 1 (least impact) to 6 (most impact). A “difference” of zero indicates that
importance and ability to impact are the same; a positive “difference” score indicates that importance to legislators is rated
higher than ability to impact, and vice-versa.
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